Btw, it is not the biggest doubt I have about the Company. The biggest one is the shareholder structure and how Botin gets his mandate. The 2nd biggest one is a detailed workout of the DTA new regulations and its impact on capital ratio, including the effects of reasonable future earnings projections in Spain to 2019. If anyone has answers to these doubts, please let them know.
Here is the sovereign exposure, all amounts in €mi.
Residual Maturity |
Total Gross |
of which Loans |
Total Net |
of which AFS |
of which At fair value |
of which Trading |
End 2012 | ||||||
0-3M | 651 | 166 | 643 | 0 | 0 | 446 |
3M-1Y | 4452 | 784 | 3843 | 0 | 0 | 3059 |
1Y-2Y | 2797 | 1699 | 2566 | 0 | 0 | 867 |
2Y-3Y | 5925 | 4789 | 5615 | 125 | 0 | -120 |
3Y-5Y | 6991 | 3057 | 6293 | 2939 | 0 | 217 |
5Y-10Y | 22144 | 2812 | 22010 | 19180 | 0 | 18 |
10Y-more | 4839 | 2049 | 4615 | 2410 | 0 | -85 |
Total Spain | 47798 | 15356 | 45586 | 24654 | 0 | 4403 |
Total Group | 66051 | 15997 | 55014 | 34519 | 3326 | |
end S1 2013 | ||||||
0-3M | 1344 | 150 | 1343 | 0 | 131 | 1062 |
3M-1Y | 6156 | 1294 | 5639 | 199 | 13 | 4132 |
1Y-2Y | 2752 | 1357 | 2376 | 2 | 82 | -80 |
2Y-3Y | 4453 | 3365 | 4182 | 183 | 549 | 84 |
3Y-5Y | 13672 | 4833 | 12679 | 8172 | 291 | -747 |
5Y-10Y | 29989 | 3088 | 29541 | 25277 | 295 | 881 |
10Y-more | 8594 | 1956 | 7824 | 6202 | 208 | -542 |
Total Spain | 66958 | 16044 | 63584 | 40035 | 1570 | 4790 |
Total Group | 90877 | 16762 | 74743 | 52231 | 1570 | 3025 |
Relative growth | ||||||
0-3M | 106.45% | -9.64% | 108.86% | NM | NM | 138.12% |
3M-1Y | 38.27% | 65.05% | 46.73% | NM | NM | 35.08% |
1Y-2Y | -1.61% | -20.13% | -7.40% | NM | NM | -109.23% |
2Y-3Y | -24.84% | -29.73% | -25.52% | 46.40% | NM | -170.00% |
3Y-5Y | 95.57% | 58.10% | 101.48% | 178.05% | NM | -444.24% |
5Y-10Y | 35.43% | 9.82% | 34.22% | 31.79% | NM | 4794.44% |
10Y-more | 77.60% | -4.54% | 69.53% | 157.34% | NM | 537.65% |
Total Spain | 40.09% | 4.48% | 39.48% | 62.39% | NM | 8.79% |
Total Group | 37.59% | 4.78% | 35.86% | 51.31% | NM | -9.05% |
Net sovereign exposure to Spain Q2 2013 at €64bi, up 40% in 6 months, representing 85% of the total exposure to sovereign risk! That includes €16bi of direct loans. However €40bi of this exposure is available for sale.
That is much more than I thought and the increase is impressive for 2 reasons: (1) 40% growth in 6 months and (2) it happens after the height of the Spanish crisis that happened in summer 2012.
I think this is a good part of the explanation of the RWA decrease by 8% in Q2 2013.
Increase in sovereign exposure could be due to increased liquidity of group. More deposits and less loans. As I understand it there are not much options for banks to use this liquidity in any other way than sovereign bonds. Besides Spanish bonds could earn Santander some extra money as Spaish economy is recovering. This also indicates that Santander believes in Spanish recovery and is betting big money on it. Or it could be big politics - helping Spain to borrow more cheaply and earning political favors.
ReplyDeleteyes, parking excess liquidity on relatively high yield bonds is surely a factor. But sovereign bonds have also the major advantage to have 0 risk weight so not sure it is only liquidity parking. However regulation can change related to that.
Deletein this article there is some info on sovereign exposure
ReplyDeletehttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/327217b6-5ddc-11e3-8fca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nlAne5WZ
For those who are not subscribed to FT:
DeletePut the Link in Google Search and click on the found link to get to the article.